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Abstract 
The article compares industrial relations in a single transnational automotive firm with 
production sites in both Slovakia and Russia, based on document analysis and fieldwork 
respectively. Empirical findings are examined in the light of a working-class power approach 
(Wright, 2000; Silver, 2005; Schmalz and Dörre, 2014). In Slovakia, unions sustain non-
conflict engagement with management while in Russia new unions make use of 
unconventional methods of protest to promote worker interests. Interdependences of 
transnational firms along the value chain, as well as differing national, political and economic 
determinants of former socialist countries, make a comparative appraisal of the current 
situation of workers and their trade unions challenging. In Slovakia associational and 
institutional power is well developed and influenced by the model of German work councils, 
but structural power is weakly exercised. In Russia structural working-class power remains 
strong, but the opportunities for transforming this into lasting associational, let alone 
institutional power, remain limited.  
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Introduction  
 
This article compares industrial relations in two production sites of a transnational automotive firm –  
Russia and Slovakia. The Russian case is based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork with workers 
and in-depth interviews with union representatives; the comparator case is drawn from recent 
scholarship. Their difference lies in the different economic and production orientation of the firm. We 
assume that, although with Russia and Slovakia present different post-communist economic settings, 
with the entry of a transnational firm the mode of workers’ power is to a significant extent shaped by 
the company’s economic direction and – to a lesser degree – by the national employment relations of 
the firm’s headquarters. The Slovak branch, established in 1991, can be seen as an extended 
workbench of the German headquarters, focusing entirely on export. Industrial relations at the site in 
Bratislava are strongly influenced by the German model of employment relations: a dual system of 
negotiation processes at plant level, between an institution similar to a works council and management 
on the one hand side, and between trade union, at the point of both plant and corporate level, with 
management and corporate institutions such as formal employer associations on the other hand side. 
At the firm’s Russian facility, newly established in 2008, by contrast production is exclusively 
focusing on the domestic market. Lower interconnections and dependencies of the Russian plant with 
the German headquarters, due to its specific economic aims, give reason for less influence and 
adaptation of the ‘German’ established modes of negotiation processes between capital and work for 
‘Russian’ employment relations. We also argue, that the latter constellation, with a successful 
automobile firm entering the Russian market, offers the chance to find new modes of conflict and 
negotiation between workers and management in the context of an industrial relations system mainly 
oriented towards former Soviet legacies.  
 
While during transition from socialism Central Eastern European (CEE) countries like Slovakia had 
initially better political and structural advantages for strong union development, we find the current 
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movement in the sphere of transnational firms to be rather muted there in comparison to Russia. There 
we observe a rise in new, conflict-oriented trade unions challenging not only the foreign employers 
but the established system of industrial relations. While in countries such as Slovakia, unions act 
equivocally and restrict their actions to mainly non-conflict engagement with management 
(Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015), in Russia, new automotive unions make use of unconventional 
methods of protest to promote worker interests. Entangled interconnections and dependences of 
transnational firms along the value chain, largely lying beneath the surface, as well as differing 
national, political and economic determinants of former socialist countries, make a comparative 
appraisal of the current situation of workers and their trade unions challenging. This calls for broad 
theoretical-conceptual considerations to uncover the mechanisms of worker interest representation in 
transnational automotive firms across borders in what are emerging as ‘varieties’ of post-socialist 
labour contexts in ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001). We therefore contextualize our 
empirical findings with a working class power approach (WCP), first comprehensively described by 
Silver (2005) and Wright (2000) and pursued by Schmalz and Dörre (2014). In this article, we focus 
on the dominant presence of the German manufacturer Volkswagen in Russia and Slovakia. The data 
collected stem from long-term ethnographic fieldwork in the Kaluga region since 2009 focusing on 
labour responses to the decline in paternalism in local industry and the rise in neoliberal approaches to 
production relations in such firms, as well as the arrival of TNC automotive firms (Morris, 2011, 
2012). In addition, the article uses interview-based field research from 2012-13 focusing on the 
development of alternative unions in foreign firms, car producers and suppliers in Russia. To draw out 
connections and differences, we contrast our case with that of a Slovak plant of the same firm in 
Bratislava where information is gathered through comprehensive document analysis. Our research 
investigates what sources of power are available to the predominantly young workforce in Russia and 
how newly established unions are able to direct these sources and make use of them in specific 
conflicts with employers, demonstrating structural power and even gaining associational strength. The 
empirically-based research uncovers new forms of union activism in the particularly hostile-to-labour 
political and economic environment of contemporary Russia. By examining the Russian case in a 
comparative CEE context, we highlight the uneven development of WCP in post-socialist countries 
that all experienced a strong shift towards neoliberalism during transition.  
The article proceeds as follows. First, we introduce the WCP resource approach as a 
theoretical concept to contextualize the empirical findings of our research. We propose WCP as an 
innovative tool of analysis of contemporary developments in workers’ power and labour interest 
representation in the wake of the continuing exploitation of labour by globally acting firms in 
peripheral and semi-peripheral countries (the latter include post-socialist states). We then trace the 
different preconditions of workers’ power resources in the automotive sector, focusing on the 
development of trade unions in Russia and Slovakia respectively. Following the examination of power 
relations in the industry, we examine the actual successes, setbacks and difficulties trade unions 
agitating in TNCs face in each country as well as possible shifts in power. Finally, we contextualize 
our findings in reference to the relevance of the adopted theoretical approach given the complex nature 
of employment relations in a transnational perspective.  
 
 
Working Class Power approach  
 
The theoretical departure of this article is the systematic conceptualization of working class power that 
offers analysis of employment relations from a transnational and diachronic perspective (Schmalz and 
Dörre, 2014; Silver, 2005; Wright, 2000). This approach allows us to examine the state of particular 
industrial relations systems in a comparative way – here contrasting two cases in different national 
contexts – while taking account of their historical legacies as postsocialist countries. Moreover, 
studying WCP in transnational contexts reveals processes of possible labour revitalization in a 
comparative perspective. This is particular noteworthy, as so far the literature on labour revitalization 
tends to focus on national contexts in the global north, or ‘centre’ of TNCs’ activity, rarely taking 
account of semi-peripheral or peripheral countries, as well as infrequently considering post-communist 
legacies (Sznajder Lee and Trappmann, 2014).     
In our analysis, we look at three distinct forms of workers’ power resources, all developing in 
phases, each emerging out of one another, and partly competing with each other. These processes are 
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not to be understood in a sense of absolute linearity, but rather it is possible to analyze changes in the 
systems of employment relations as changes in the deployability of power resources (Dörre, 2011: 
267).  
The primary source of workers’ power is their structural power, indicated by marketplace 
bargaining power on the one hand and workplace bargaining power on the other. The former is a 
direct result of tight labour markets, characterized by 1) the possession of scarce skills demanded by 
employers, 2) low unemployment, and 3) workers’ ability to withdraw labour and get income from 
other sources than wage labour (Silver, 2005: 31). The segmentation of labour markets as well as state 
interventions and regulatory have significant influence on the structural power of workers (Schmalz 
and Dörre, 2014: 223).  
 Workplace bargaining power contributes to structural power and describes the strategic 
position of workers within an industrial key sector (Wright, 2000: 962). These key positions, i.e. in 
important export branches and highly integrated production processes such as the automotive industry 
mean that workers can disrupt these processes through local strikes and protests to an extent thatnot 
possible in other areas (Silver, 2005: 31). Even actions short of a strike can be effective in wresting 
higher wages and better working conditions from employers, because they entail similarly high costs, 
e.g. through so-called ‘Italian’ strikes (work-to-rule) or acts of sabotage (Schmalz and Dörre, 2014: 
222).  
Associational power as a second source of labour power relates to workers’ capabilities to 
establish functioning collective organizations, such as trade unions, to represent their interests in 
opposition to capital (Wright, 2000: 962). Associational power can partially substitute structural 
power, but cannot fully replace it (Brinkmann et al. 2008: 25; see also Hinz and Woschnack, 2013). 
As a secondary form of bargaining power its operationalization relies on organisational processes and 
the formation of collective actors, in contrast to primary power (Silver, 2005: 30f.). Schmalz and 
Dörre identify five main characteristics determining associational power: First, higher union density in 
single branches and stronger workers’ organizations at plant level indicate that it is more likely 
workers are successfully represented. A second indicator is infrastructural resources, referring to 
material resources such as trade union property as well as their personnel resources. Organizational 
efficiency is identified as a third indicator. Fourth, member participation – whether union members 
engage in strikes and other protest forms, but also in internal processes of discussion – is an important 
factor of associational power. The fifth indicator is internal cohesion of the organization, meaning the 
solidarity of union members, which makes associational power possible in the first place and 
resolutely demonstrates it (Schmalz and Dörre, 2014: 225f.). Beyond that organizational flexibility is 
crucial in exercising meaningful associational power. This could mean specific recombination of 
resources such as organizing and mobilizing new members (Schmalz and Dörre, 2014: 226).    
Thirdly, we consider workers’ institutional power: the result of negotiations and conflicts 
carried out through structural or associational power. Institutional power as a secondary workers’ 
resource usually builds upon these sources of workers’ power, and institutions are the concrete form of 
the two primary sources respectively (Brinkmann and Nachtwey, 2010: 21). Schmalz and Dörre claim 
that while institutional power bestows on trade unions comprehensive rights, it simultaneously leads to 
constraints on their capability for action as organizations (Schmalz and Dörre, 2014: 227f.). 
Institutional power presents a dilemma to unions; as they gain legal legitimacy there is a tendency for 
them to become less conflict-oriented, but they risk losing members and therefore associational power 
if they do become more amenable to employers and the state – both sources that legitimate unions’ 
institutuional power. Unions need to find a way to balance themselves as organizations within this 
vicious circle. Institutional power can persist even when societal balances of power have shifted, as 
long as organizations such as trade unions are capable of acting as authentic representatives of 
workers’ interests and are accepted as such. Trade unions can still use institutional power resources 
when their associational power is in (long-term) decline (Brinkmann, 2008: 25). On the other hand, 
institutional power can also erode over time. Typically this occurs during intense phases of 
globalization involving relocations of production in order to save costs and increase flexibility for 
capital, or through targeted assaults on institutional power, such as significant changes in labour laws 
(Schmalz and Dörre, 2014: 229).      
 
 
Power imbalances – employment relations in Russia and Slovakia 
 4 
 
Russia’s trade union umbrella organization FNPR is the largest of its kind in Europe with 
approximately 24 million members (Bizyukov and Grishko, 2012). Unions belonging to this huge 
association are the inheritors of the former Soviet Union organisation FTsSPS, which was directly 
subordinated to the communist party. To date and with few exceptions they act as preservers of the 
Soviet legacies, mostly being responsible for administering and distributing social benefits to the 
workforce under management’s guidelines (Ashwin and Clarke, 2001; Mandel, 2004). Although these 
trade unions still enjoy strong institutional power due to their intensive cooperationalist nature with 
the state, FNPR unions are dependent thereon to such an extent that their associational power is 
inexorably eroding. This means, that institutional power is less and less underpinned by consistent 
associational power. Massive loss of members since 1990 and the lack of serious organizational 
restructuring mean that their institutional power is very fragile. FNPR unions rarely initiate strikes or 
other forms of protest action following workers’ growing discontent with structural and plant-specific 
issues, despite the increasing demand by workers to have their interests represented in terms of wages, 
working time and security and safety. Due to the ongoing rejection of class conflict, which is not 
compatible with the self-concept of those bureaucratic organisations, FNPR unions’ use of potential 
structural power in concentrating strong associational power to give voice to workers’ demands is low 
(Olimpieva, 2012).  
About a sixth of Slovakian workers are trade union members. Union density there is 
considerably higher than in many other CEE countries. While the KOZ SR is the dominating umbrella 
organization for trade unions and mainly performs coordinating functions, its individual trade unions 
are considered influential and to act mostly autonomously (Glassner and Galgóczi, 2006). KOZ SR 
grew out of the former Czechoslovakian CSKOS in 1993, which itself is the predecessor of the former 
communist ROH, dissolved in 1990. Like most union organizations in Central Eastern Europe, the 
Slovakian trade unions have experienced significant member losses during the transition period and 
beyond. Since 1993 the membership has shrunk from around 1.5 million to a mere 310,000 (Glassner 
and Galgóczi, 2006; see also Ost, 2009). Like in Russia, Slovak unions are not known for their 
conflict-oriented actions; strike and protest action are on the low side (Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015). 
Similarly to Russia and seemingly a remnant of socialist-era paternalistic production culture is the 
high significance for workers of the maintenance of a social wage (Voss et al., 2006). 
While the Slovak union system tried to reform itself from within and made some serious 
attempts to influence political decisions of governments as well as reorientate itself towards serving 
workers’ shifting demands, the traditional FNPR unions in Russia were mostly mute and busy 
defending their institutional power, giving in to state-forced concessions, most often carried out on the 
backs of their members (Ashwin and Clarke, 2001; Kohl, 2008; Mandel, 2004; Vinogradova et al., 
2012;). Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov (2011) highlight the ‘peculiar’ structural adjustment of the 
transition period where the highly unionized workforce suffered a halving of real wages in industrial 
work over a period of less than 10 years. This labour ‘quiescence’ was the price for avoiding mass 
layoffs, and unions acquiesced to this form of structural adjustment (see Vinogradova et al., 2012). In 
such an environment, workers grew more and more frustrated, eventually leading to some cycles of 
intense and desperate protest action beyond the organisational structures of traditional unions in 
Russia during the 1990s (see Greene and Robertson, 2009).  
In this context and with the beginning of the neoliberalization of the labour market from 1990 
onwards, there have been serious attempts of alternative union building in Russia. These burgeoning 
trade unions, focusing on conflict and agitation, gave reason to presume that some transformation of 
the established and inflexible industrial relations system might be possible, insofar that they would be 
able to at least appear as a serious counterpart to the ‘dinosaur’ unions belonging to FNPR (Greene 
and Robertson, 2009). However, these attempts failed during the 1990s, partly due to internal 
organisational conflicts of leaders and to some considerable extent to the strong support the FNPR 
unions enjoy from the state. While the alternative unions were able to demonstrate strong structural 
power among a number of sectors, especially in industry and transport, they experienced significant 
difficulties in gaining stable associational power as well as meaningful institutional power. Eventually, 
this difficult melée led to their collapse only a few years after they first appeared. Their most 
considerable achievement however has been the emergence of two further umbrella organizations in 
1995, KTR and VKT (both merged to KTR in 2010), which were officially acknowledged and 
organize about three million members (Bizyukov and Grishko, 2012). But to date, employment 
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relations in Russia are marked by an overpresence of the traditional FNPR unions, while 
simultaneously characterized by inertia of both their union organizations and their members 
(Olimpieva, 2012).  
After Slovakia became fully independent in 1993, several trade unions emerged which acted 
independently of the dominant KOZ SR (Stein, 2001). These were mainly in occupational sectors that 
enjoy strong bargaining power, e.g. transportation. However, throughout transition they never fully 
gained recognition and were not able to fundamentally challenge the existing trade union system 
(Kohl, 2008). As Stein puts it, in Slovakia ‘labour radicalism never found a foothold among workers’ 
(2001). Labour and unions alike pursued goals through quiescence instead of significant protest action, 
least of all social unrest. This set the stage for the particularly harsh neoliberalization the Slovak 
economy experienced after independence in 1993, and which even accelerated after 2004, when the 
country joined the European Union (Sznajder Lee and Trappmann, 2014). In fact, the established trade 
union systems of both Russia and Slovakia have experienced roughly similar developments. Generally 
speaking, the traditional unions in both national contexts tried to preserve their fragile institutional 
establishment and their continually weakening associational power, acting relatively non-politically 
and subordinate to the several existing governments1 (Kohl, 2008; Olimpieva, 2012). Overall, in the 
second decade of transition from socialism, the weakness of labour and an illusory nature of 
corporatism (in terms of delivering results to labour) were observed (Crowley, 2004; Ost, 2009). 
However, during recent years we again observe the development of a new alternative union 
movement in Russia that challenges the traditional system of employment relations and might have the 
strength even to shift the balances of power. These unions have also evolved in economic sectors that 
are characterized by significant bargaining power, here especially in foreign firms. In our contrasting 
Slovak case, nothing similar has happened after foreign firms made their first appearances, often 
during the 1990s. In the following section we give a contrasting juxtaposition of the three main 
sources of WCP focusing on the Volkswagen plants in both Bratislava and Kaluga to provide an 
explanatory approach for these uneven developments in roughly comparable post-socialist contexts, 
both experiencing intensive neoliberalization and deregulation with the entry of transnational firms in 
industrial key sectors as well as being characterized by a similar traditional system of industrial 
relations and political-historical heritage. 
 
 
Shifting powers in employment relations through transnational corporations in 
Russia and Slovakia 
 
In the following section, we explore the growth of workers’ power in Volkswagen’s Russian plant, 
where such developments are particularly visible. This case is contrasted with a company facility in 
Slovakia, where union density is traditionally high and yet workers remain quiescent although 
seemingly enjoying considerable bargaining power. 
Despite the Russian economy’s heavy reliance on natural resources, the automotive industry is 
a key sector for the government and its aim to diversify the domestic economy to a more modern high-
tech one. While still a small part of GDP (2012: 3.7%) due to the dominance of oil and gas, by 2008 
Russia was the fastest growing vehicle market in the world by value (Krkoska and Spencer, 2008). Car 
production offers great potential for innovation and therefore enjoys significant support and subsidies. 
Both domestic and foreign firms benefit from state incentives, however, the latter have long outpaced 
the traditional firms in productivity, overall leading to a dominant presence of foreign firms 
(Arutyonova and Orlova, 2013; see also Traub-Merz, 2015). Consequently, one of the main focuses of 
this modernization programme is the (further) attraction of foreign capital to either build joint ventures 
with Russian car producers or else invest in greenfield sites, offering unified taxes as well as providing 
tailored infrastructure in a number of regions all over the country. Like in Russia, this sector was 
established as a main pillar of production in Slovakia and was rewarded with a number of investments 
attracting foreign capital, such as the creation of industrial parks, flat taxes and governmental 
subsidies, securing prestigious projects (Pavlínek, 2014). Especially after joining the European Union 
in 2004, Slovakia became an ever more important space of car production by foreign manufacturers. 
But the situation here is more pronounced than it is in Russia. With a share of 12 per cent of the 
national GDP the automotive industry is the biggest in Slovakia and given the per capita car 
production, Slovakia’s is the highest in the world. Among the new EU members it is the third largest 
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producer after the Czech Republic and Poland (Pavlínek, 2014).  
 The Kaluga region, directly bordering the Moscow area in the southwest, has been 
particularly attractive to foreign carmakers, not only because of numerous incentives of the regional 
government, but also because of the close geographical proximity to Moscow and Western Europe 
(GCC, 2012). Volkswagen, the largest foreign car producer in Russia, and focus of our research, 
settled here in 2008, accompanied by a number of significant foreign suppliers. The producer employs 
around 6000 workers at its Kaluga facility.  
Alongside PSA Peugeot and KIA, Volkswagen is also the biggest car producer in Slovakia. 
Already in 1991 as part of its ambitious CEE expansion strategy2, Volkswagen established its main 
Slovak subsidiary as a joint venture at a brownfield site in Bratislava, which was built in the 1980s as 
part of BAZ, where Škoda produced its cars (Pavlínek, 2014). When the German firm eventually took 
over the Czech brand in 1999, it simultaneously became owner of the factory. Currently, about 8600 
workers are employed there (Jakubiak et al., 2000).  
In both firms’ facilities most employees work in assembly and only around 15 per cent in 
Slovakia and 30 per cent in Kaluga respectively are employed as technicians or administrative workers 
(Voss et al., 2006). As in the Kaluga region, the entry of Volkswagen to the Bratislava region was 
followed by foreign suppliers, which gave the region a considerable economic boost. Kaluga is one of 
the most economically promising regions in Russia and just like the region around Bratislava it is 
highly dependent on the automotive firms’ involvement. Not surprisingly, the firm experiences similar 
challenges in hiring and retaining skilled labour in both regions. The continuing recruitment of skilled 
labour is accompanied by rising labour shortages in both national contexts, which is why the 
workforce commutes up to one hundred kilometres to the plants (GCC, 2012; Hancké, 2011). 
Interestingly in Russia, at the same time and despite the economic boost, there is still significant work 
migration from Kaluga to Moscow, which is only a two-hour train ride commute (Falkner, 2012). 
Simultaneously, the informal economy remains a realistic alternative for many workers (Morris, 
2014). Both factors indicate greater structural WCP in Russia as a result of the particular paths 
transition from socialism each country has taken and the varieties of capitalism their economies now 
represent (see Lane and Myant, 2006).  
The rising significance of foreign firms in Russia starting with the 2000s and further gaining 
importance around 2005, simultaneously heralds a new area of alternative trade unionism 
(Chetvernina, 2009; Olimpieva, 2012). Newly emerging unions, independent of the traditionally 
grown system of employment relations, quickly took the chance to address workers’ rights and 
interests in these transnational companies. Just like the alternative unions of the 1990s, small unions at 
company level emerge out of concrete conflict situations between workers and management. They 
manage to make use of workers’ traditionally strong marketplace and workplace bargaining power in 
the automotive industry by mobilizing large groups of workers in the production process in order to 
achieve typical workers’ demands evolving around wage, working time as well as health and safety at 
the workplace. Most of these small, local unions are affiliated with the MPRA, being the dominant 
alternative automotive union in transnational firms (Krzywdzinski, 2011; Olimpieva, 2012).  
In Slovakia on the other hand, despite a similarly growing presence of globally acting firms, 
especially in the car industry, there has not been any significant boost in challenging the incumbent 
system of employment relations. Also lacking are any tendencies of reorganization of trade union 
structures, from within the established trade union body or through the founding of significant new, 
independent unions as in the Russian case (Kohl, 2008; Stein, 2001).  
Not surprisingly, the VW plant in Kaluga was subject to comprehensive unionization, 
supported by the alternative branch union MPRA, shortly after the factory first opened. Not until four 
years later though, in 2012, with some 1200 workers organized, did the union gain formal recognition 
by the management.. However, despite union membership being relatively low – around 23 per cent of 
production operatives, MPRA is the dominant union at the plant, which makes it the official collective 
bargaining partner for management and the other unions to become subordinate elements in 
negotiations.3 The relationship of all parties is marked by lack of communication and low levels of 
interactions. Relations between management and MPRA union can be even described as tense and 
difficult from the very beginning. While management notoriously refuses to interact with the main 
union, the latter sees no alternatives as to call their members for strikes and protest action in order to 
articulate workers’ basic interests. When labour conflicts at the plant arise and cannot be solved 
through classical negotiation practices, frequent outbursts of protest take place from time to time. 
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Trade unions manage to mobilize members for concrete protest actions that sometimes use 
unconventional means, i.e. work-to-rule actions or country-wide boycotts.  
In contrast, employment relations at VW Bratislava are considered to be an exemplary well-
functioning cooperation between union and management. There is only one union present, which is a 
member of the large sectoral trade union OZ KOVO, affiliated with the traditional KOZ SR. Union 
density at the plant is very high, around 74 per cent. Collective bargaining and further collective 
agreements are stable institutions at the plant, unionists are members of several joint committees, i.e. 
for health and safety issues at the workplace, and communication and meetings between union and 
managements take place on a regular basis (Voss et al., 2006). Overall, worker representation by the 
trade union is considered to be satisfactory by both the union and the management and the relationship 
between the parties is supposedly ‘good, constructive and cooperative’ (Voss et al., 2006; see also 
Tholen, 2008). Voss et al. assess that the trade union is much like a German style works council in 
terms of operation, plant-level dialogue and negotiation practice as well as worker interest 
representation (Voss et al., 2006). Most of this is considered to be successful because of ‘excellent 
HRM practices’ rather than a well-functioning employment relations system (Meardi, 2012; see also 
Tholen, 2008). However, collective bargaining agreements tend to be weak, with little effect on 
management decision-making, only on their implementation (Glassner and Galgóczi, 2009). Neither 
the union nor the workers independently have initiated any strikes in order to enforce their requests. 
Although there have been a couple of strike alerts announced by the union, the parties involved settled 
on joint agreements in each case.  
 
Chances and limits of structural bargaining power 
 
As mentioned, the automotive sector dominates Kaluga region, leading to significant marketplace 
bargaining power of workers employed in it. This becomes most evident in a very high turnover rate at 
the Volkswagen plant; an annual 1000 workers turnover is not unusual there. While many of the 
departures are voluntary, because of other job options, including in the informal economy, a 
significant number can be classified as being compulsory. These workers leave the plant only after a 
short time due to infringements of strict rules or in response to disciplinary measures short of 
dismissal by draconian management.  
At the onset of transition, Russia and CEE had very similarly structured economies and 
employment (Cazes and Nesporova, 2001). In Russia though, labour turnover has remained very high 
(Gimpelson and Lippoldt. 1997; Lehman and Wadsworth, 2000; Morris, 2011). Fit and skilled 
workers are in short supply, workers ‘churn’ frequently, and make significant use of alternative 
informal work. These and other factors, indicate potentially high structural power. In CEE, labour 
turnover is much lower (Cazes and Nesporova, 2001), the informal economy is also less significant: 
labour is much less tight. The latter therefore plays an important role in an increasing labour shortage 
at the plant and is unwilling or unable to significantly contribute to a change on its own behalf. This 
on the other hand, strengthens workers’ marketplace bargaining power in the long term: As less and 
less people are willing to hire at the plant, those remaining even gain in bargaining strength, well 
aware of labour shortages. So far, the workers and their union have been fairly successful in 
demonstrating their power in the production process by threatening management with numerous 
accounts of strike or protest announcements in order to move the management to negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements and further agreements. Up until now, management has mostly given in before 
it came to actual protest action, being aware of labour’s power. By giving in to some demands and 
concessions, it avoids further heavy costs, resulting from stoppages or other interferences in the 
production process initiated by workers.    
Similarly to Kaluga, workers employed in the automotive industry in the Bratislava region 
enjoy very high levels of marketplace bargaining power, especially as firms like Volkswagen also 
experience increasing labour shortages and struggle to recruit sufficient skilled workers. Accordingly, 
workers mostly leave the plant of their own accord, frequently citing ambitions to migrate to Western 
European countries, where they anticipate higher wages (Perry and Power, 2007). It is unclear whether 
a high turnover rate here is also partially due to an oppressively managerialist environment in terms of 
monitoring, punitive action and interpretations by workers of a lack of autonomy, as is the case in 
Kaluga. Though, this is not very likely as a number of sources claim good relations between capital 
and labour side. While we lack clear empirical data on Slovakia, in Kaluga it is widely known that 
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there is an open conflict smouldering between management and workforce (Pavlínek, 2014; Tholen, 
2008; Voss et al., 2006). As the plant produces for export markets and depends very much on its CEE 
facilities, workers can claim a similarly high workplace bargaining power as those employed at the 
Kaluga plant. Workers’ interventions in the production process through strikes and protest actions 
would, just like in Kaluga manufacturing for the domestic market, lead to very high costs for the firm, 
causing problems in reaching the plant’s production target figures. However, workers’ theoretically 
very high structural power at VW Slovakia is counteracted through this very export orientation at the 
same time. Volkswagen in Russia solely relies on its Russian facilities for serving the domestic 
market, as the alternative would have to be to go back to importing cars to Russia, which is 
considerably more expensive for Volkswagen and other transnational firms acting in Russia and would 
be encumbered by the government. In contrast, the VW management in Slovakia could always 
threaten workers with a potential relocation of production to countries where labour is cheaper. In over 
24 years of Volkswagen presence in Bratislava a workers’ strike has never occurred (Wuestner, 2012). 
 
 
The ambiguous reality of associational power 
 
All protest action taking place at VW in Kaluga is initiated by the MPRA trade union3, eager to 
articulate workers’ demands regarding wages and working time. Besides also being engaged in the 
improvement of working conditions surrounding health and safety issues, one of the main focuses of 
the union is on the reduction of agency work, which is excessively used by management. The union 
was able to gain a significant number of members in the wake of the first collective bargaining period 
in 2012, which it initiated after the union at one of Volkswagen’s key suppliers in close proximity, 
Benteler, reached a collective bargaining agreement with management after large scale strike and 
protest action, that also had effects on VW’s production. For VW management it must have been a 
clear sign that the demands and ability to follow through on the threat of strikes to a great degree were 
backed up within the workforce of the plant and beyond. They had reason to fear that the union would 
mobilize its members at the producers’ plant for strategic protest action to get the management to 
negotiate with the union. So, especially at plant and local level the MPRA union managed to recruit 
significant numbers of members within a short period of time, willing to fight for their claims and 
occasionally doing so through strikes, and in frequent protest actions, that are not so overt at first 
glance. These included work-to-rule, which almost like a ‘real’ strike imposes tremendous costs for 
the firm. Further benefit of such industrial action is the avoidance of strict and repressive labour laws 
that set high barriers for trade unions to declare a legal strike in the first place. What also fosters the 
plant organizations’ associational power is the low hierarchical organization of the union on sectoral-
organizational level. Fewer bureaucratic hurdles within the organization are to the advantage of the 
mostly local acting unions. While a lot of the member dues of traditional unions in Russia are spent on 
social benefits, member dues going to the MPRA unions are usually differently distributed. As many 
of its organizations are militant and conflict oriented, significant amounts of dues go to the strike fund. 
However, besides the rather optimistic explanations regarding the union’s associational power, the 
trade union, both on plant and sectoral level, is still at the learning stage and struggles to stabilize its 
resources within the organization. One example: After a collective bargaining agreement was reached 
with VW in 2012, the union experienced a significant drop in members, down from 33 to 23 per cent. 
The difficulty of combining the varying interests of members and at the same time informing the 
workforce about current states of negotiations with management is supposedly a crucial task for 
obtaining lasting associational power, active union members in Kaluga have identified.    
Given the union density, associational power at VW in Bratislava is much higher than in 
Kaluga. But it is important to note here that this union existed at the plant before VW acquired it over 
a period of roughly ten years. This also means that most union members have been inherited from the 
socialist period, when union membership was mandatory. The preconditions for associational power, 
especially given union density, therefore have to be clearly distinguished here. With VW’s opening of 
its plant in Kaluga, there was no union present at first, which gave the alternative unions a sufficient 
chance to organize the workforce; it did not have to break established close relations between 
management and traditional unions that are still typical for numerous Russian firms. Also, union 
representation at these two VW facilities follows entirely different self-conceptions. While the 
dominating union at VW in Kaluga does not entirely refute the tactical possibility of treating 
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management as a partner in collective bargaining, it stresses much more their asymmetric relationship 
and focuses on conflict and the enforcement of workers’ demands through protest action and the threat 
of it towards management. The opposite seems to be the case at VW Bratislava, where both 
management and union see each other as equal partners, regularly negotiating agreements in collective 
bargaining rounds, with the union being involved in a number of joint committees and meetings 
(Tholen, 2008). In effect, their associational power relies much less on their ability to mobilize the 
workforce in order to reach agreements as is the case in Kaluga. Instead it is rather characterized by 
their ability to act as co-management and sustain membership at the same time. Ultimately, unlike the 
Kaluga case Volkswagen Slovakia can somewhat claim a corporate culture for its Bratislava plant that 
seems strongly influenced by the parent enterprise with its German model of industrial relations. This 
is not only appraised by management, but by the union as well, as the workforce perceives VW 
Slovakia as a German enterprise (Tholen, 2008). Although, there are some loose connections between 
the German metal union, IG Metall, and MPRA at VW in Kaluga, the latter does not refer to this 
Rhine-Alpine model of capitalism with its system of industrial relations. Instead the union almost 
rejects any idea of establishing ’social partnership‘, preferring to grow from below in its own local 
context, with struggle being their main instrument of assertiveness. 
 
 
Institutional embedding as an ambivalent power resource of trade unions  
So far and besides the MPRA gaining formal recognition as an official trade union associated with the 
umbrella organization KTR, which unifies mostly alternative unions, the sectoral unions’ institutional 
power is low. Collective agreements, where they exist, are limited to plant level. There are no 
comprehensive bargaining negotiations on a sectoral or sectoral-regional level, which keeps the unions 
actions mainly local and their influence limited. This is mostly due to the plant organizations’ priority 
on improving basic working conditions in their own factory, viewing binding agreements beyond the 
plant as ‘far away’. Also, neither employers in TNC nor employers in the automotive sector in general 
organize themselves in employer associations, which means that the MPRA would have no collective 
bargaining partner on sectoral or regional level, making such negotiations superfluous. Overall and 
similar to their 1990s counterparts, these new unions are marked by the difficulties in transforming 
their exceptional successes in the field of basic structural power to a lasting associational and to 
meaningful institutional power and influence. Their limited institutional power is also largely 
restrained by the state, which has no interest in a transformation of the employment relations system 
that would give such alternative, conflict-oriented unions significant opportunities to gain power. Too 
great is the fear of its possible ambitions to directly interfere in policy-making and influence labour 
markets and social politics, or even gain the capability to provoke forms of social unrest. To avoid 
such a scenario, the government prefers to artificially keep the traditional unions as dominant actors in 
the sphere of employment relations, despite opposing trends. With an overall reform of the labour 
code in 2001 it took an important step in restricting capacities to act especially for smaller, alternative 
unions (Olimpieva, 2012; see also Greene and Robertson, 2009). While a lower degree of institutional 
power can result in a more manoeuverable union, it is questionable whether those unions will be able 
not only to survive but to evolve under these hostile circumstances.    
Institutional power of the trade union agitating at VW in Bratislava seems fairly integrated. 
Not only is the union formally recognized by management and accepted as a bargaining partner, col-
lective bargaining is a normal and functioning part of the employment relations framework established 
in Slovakia, where sectoral agreements are even generally binding (Kohl, 2008). While experiencing a 
downward spiral of associational power given the eroding number of union members in general, the 
Slovak unions benefit from their traditional institutional incorporation inherited from the socialist past. 
This is similar to the Russian traditional unions. Both rely to a great extent on this power factor, which 
is continually eroding. Additionally, the Slovak unions have also experienced a fall in their institution-
al and consequently their associational power through comprehensive reforms of the labour code, es-
pecially since 2004 after joining the European Union, restricting a number of established union rights 
and subsequently implementing more employer-friendly legislation (Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015; 
Meardi, 2007a). However, the Slovak auto union at Volkswagen Bratislava at the same time is an ex-
ample of transnational institutional power, as it is part of the European works council as well as the 
global works council of Volkswagen. Since the employment relations in the Bratislava plant are often 
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referred to as being heavily influenced by the traditional German system of employment relations, the 
OZ KOVO organization at VW benefits from these structures with a high dependence on the institu-
tional power of workers’ interest representation originating from the German national context (Tholen, 
2008).  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In utilizing the WCP approach we emphasize its advantages in showing interrelations of workers’ 
power among global firms and its ability to provide insights into employment relations in transnational 
contexts. Although we focus on the merits of the working-class power approach, we also acknowledge 
its limitations. These also relate to transnational contexts: processes of globalization may give rise to 
communities of struggle that compensate for nation-specific weaknesses in WCP. This is indicated in 
the Russian case where a weaker associational and institutional power – so far – is less relevant in the 
face of the ongoing legacy of strong structural bargaining power despite incorporation into the global 
economy. In the Slovak case, labour quiescence is due to the double-edged nature of stronger 
institutional and associational power, which is predicted by WCP theory. More problematic is 
accounting for path-dependency and dynamism of neoliberalization over time. Just as the plant in 
Slovakia appears strongly influenced by the German industrial relations culture, especially in 
hindsight of the plant organization similar to works councils, the neoliberal ordering of production 
regimes was already present in the early 1990s; unions had no time to adjust to the new economic and 
social realities.  
In Russia the embedding of neoliberalism in production relations remains patchy and 
incomplete. Unions, like workers, find ecological niches in changing political economies. In both 
cases therefore path dependency of labour’s positioning in the specific types of capitalism emerging 
after socialism is important to acknowledge, but is not the complete picture. The firm’s specific 
purposes in each post-socialist country account for the direction the employment relations at plant 
level develop. While the influence of actors of established industrial relations continues to be salient in 
the Slovak case, mainly serving the goals set by the German headquarter for export, the same does not 
apply for the plant in Russia, exclusively built up to produce for Russian consumer markets and 
therefore not dependent on the goodwill of ‘superior’ plants. Thus employment relations this far from 
the German headquarters have limited effects on negotiation processes in Russia, leading to chances of 
path-dependent learning of young trade unions, which gain entry to the newly emerging transnational 
firms, an insight explored in other post-communist contexts by Meardi (2007b). 
 Bottom-up processes in TNCs can be significant in helping to break the path-dependency of 
post-communist unions, in spite of frequent employer and state hostility (ibid). As for Volkswagen 
operating in Russia the risks of relocating production to other countries, where work costs are lower, 
are low for workers, since the obstacles to importing cars to Russia, are set extremely high for foreign 
firms. Aware of this, structural power is exceptionally strong, as shown before. And while the 
production in Slovakia is key for the firm and workers’ power generally solid, the option of relocating 
production for cost reasons (such as ‘uncontrollably’ rising wages) is always there for the firm. In 
regard of keeping their workplaces, workers seemingly benefit from quiescence combined with the 
implementation of parts of the German model of employment relations demonstrating solid 
associational power while putting up mostly borrowed institutional strength. Their scope of action 
diminishes to a minimum with their seemingly strong production and marketplace bargaining power in 
mind. 
 Initially, the development of a new conflict-oriented union movement in booming regions of 
Russia appears to be promising. It has successfully represented worker interests and challenged the 
bureaucratic traditional union system through a comprehensive organization of members particularly 
in foreign owned firms, experiencing intense labour shortages. While unions gained some 
considerable achievements on plant level across a number of TNCs in the automotive sector during the 
period of roughly ten years, their prospects for lasting consolidation are not too optimistic. Our 
analysis using the working class power approach shows that the developments are largely due to 
workers’ high primary bargaining power, which is largely fostered by the company’s exclusive 
reliance on the Russian domestic car market unlike in the Slovak case. MPRA has experienced a 
notable drop in members, leading to stagnation in the development of associational power. The 
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localized character of the unions as well as the low level of organization of employers prevents 
sectoral agreements. This continues up to the institutional level, where those new union formations 
have practically no way of overcoming the stalled institutions of employment relations marked by 
traditional unions and a pseudo-paternalist state. Thus, a shift in the power balance of this established 
system is nowhere in sight.  
Although from a transnational perspective the system of industrial relations in Slovakia is 
much less conflict oriented and least of all challenged by new union formations, remaining rather 
mute, it shows that employment relations at a local level can be seen to borrow or be indirectly 
influenced by other established systems of industrial relations – here the German model. While this is 
subject to the rising pressures of neoliberal forces, it has the strength to reach beyond borders, so that 
the particular employment relations at VW Bratislava can benefit from the established institutional 
power of workers and their interest representation organization at the German main plant through the 
mere presence of transnational actors as the European works council and the global works council.  
While so far the younger VW plant in Kaluga cannot rely on such elaborated transnational 
relations, the Slovak case shows that the fostering of transnational industrial relations at company 
level can at least temporarily contribute to the development of employment relations at plant level. In 
Russia. it also shows that neoliberal intensification through globalisation also presents an opportunity 
for trade unions in transnational perspectives to gain power. However, the ongoing substitution of 
institutional power, especially based on a limited/weakening associational power in all national 
contexts involved, cannot hide the fact that the most urgent change needs to take place within the 
country-specific contexts of employment relation.  
 
 
Notes 
1 Although there have been some noteworthy division tendencies in the mid1990s, when OZ 
KOVO, the largest sectoral union of KOZ SR, very critical of Mečiar’s government, experienced a 
divide after one union committee, supporting Mečiar’s policies, found its own union, Metalurg. Both 
eventually merged back together to OZ KOVO in 2009 after a generational change took place (Sznaj-
der Lee and Trappmann 2014). 
2 For the Volkswagen group the CEE region is the most important production area, having 
some 42,000 workers employed. Besides Slovakia, the Czech Republic is the most important country 
for the firm’s production (Voss et al. 2006). 
3 Besides MPRA, two significantly smaller rival unions are present at the plant. One of them 
is an enterprise organization of ASM, belonging to the traditional FNPR umbrella, acting as partner 
for the MPRA union at several occasions despite being classified as a ‘yellow’ union by the alternative 
activists, because it mainly serves as co-management. The other union, NIP, is rumoured to have been 
implemented by management and acts fully with its support.  
4 Except for an act of workers’ sabotage that took place in 2013, when a number of cars in 
production were irreparably damaged after the management announced to exceed working time over 
weekends and holidays as a compensation for lost work days.  
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